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INTRODUCTION 
By its silence, Defendant/Appellee PIVP Hotel Management Corporation ("PIVP") has 
conceded that the Complaint contains allegations which, if proven, would entitle 
Plaintiff/Appellant R. Morgan Burkett ("Burkett") to relief. For this reason alone, this Court 
should reverse the Order of Dismissal. Moreover, PIVP's acknowledgment that the Complaint 
seeks relief (partition of real property) that is neither requested nor available in the California 
Action establishes that the Order of Dismissal cannot be affirmed on the basis of comity or under 
the Utah Arbitration Act. Finally, PIVP's admission that Burkett could not file a lis pendens 
against the Reston Hotel on the basis of the California Action establishes and that the trial court's 
order releasing the lis pendens violated Burkett's statutory rights and the public policy behind lis 
pendens. 
Contrary to PIVP's insinuations, Burkett did not file this action in order to "litigate the 
same facts and issues in multiple forums" and has not uchallenge[d] the state and federal public 
policies which favor arbitration agreements." See Brief of Appellee, pp. 2, 5. Rather, Burkett 
brought this action because Utah courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the real property in which 
Burkett claims an interest (the Reston Hotel), and because filing a lis pendens in Utah is Burkett's 
only means of protection from PIVP's attempt to sell or encumber the Reston Hotel without 
regard for Burkett's interest. Consequently, this action is proper regardless of whether Burkett's 
other rights related to the Employment Agreement are determined in another forum. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
BECAUSE IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES 
ALLEGATIONS WHICH, IF PROVEN, WOULD ENTITLE 
BURKETT TO RELIEF. 
By its silence on the issue, PIVP has conceded that Burkett would be entitled to judgment 
in his favor if he proved the allegations in the Complaint. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 6-14. Under 
Utah law, an order granting a motion to dismiss can be upheld "only where it clearly appears that 
the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of 
facts they could prove to support their claim." Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991); 
see also Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666, 668 (Utah App. 1994) (a motion to dismiss is proper only 
where the plaintiff "would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of 
facts [he] could prove to support [his] claim"). Consequently, PIVP's admission entitles Burkett 
to reversal of the trial court's Order of Dismissal. 
H. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
BECAUSE THE PRINCIPLES OF COMITY DO NOT PERMIT 
DISMISSAL. 
PIVP has failed to show a legal basis upon which this Court could affirm the Order of 
Dismissal under the principles of comity. Indeed, PIVP's failure to address the controlling 
precedent on this issue, Power Train. Inc. v. Stuver, 550 P.2d 1293, 1294 (Utah 1976), speaks 
volumes. PIVP's only attempt to buttress the Order of Dismissal based on comity is its argument 
that "California is the appropriate forum for this dispute." See Brief of Appellee, pp. 12-13. That 
argument relies upon the holding in Jackett v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 771 P.2d 
1074 (Utah App. 1994). The reasoning in Jackett, however, is irrelevant to the present case. In 
Jackett, there was no question that both California and Utah courts had jurisdiction to decide the 
case. See Jackett, 771 P.2d at 1075. Rather, the question was whether a Utah trial court had 
discretion under the principles of comity to apply California's two-year governmental immunity 
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statute of limitations to a tort action. Jackett 771 P.2d at 1075. The Jackett court's conclusion 
that the trial court acted within its discretion was based in part on the analysis that the "fortuitous 
occurrence" of a helicopter crash in Utah did not give Utah a great interest in deciding the 
dispute. Id at 1077. 
In the present case, however, Utah's interest in this dispute is clear: Utah courts are the 
only tribunal with jurisdiction over the Reston Hotel, the real property at issue in Burkett's 
partition claim. California courts cannot deliver the remedy Burkett seeks. The contrast between 
the facts in this action and those presented in Jackett demonstrate why the Jackett court held that 
"[t]he decision to apply comity in a particular case if fact sensitive." Id at 1075. The facts of the 
present case present the question whether the existence of a contract action in California permits 
the trial court to dismiss a Utah law suit concerning partition of Utah real property. The answer, 
supplied by the Utah Supreme Court, is: "[a] pending action in another state may be grounds for a 
stay of the proceedings but not for dismissal." Power Train, Inc.. 550 P.2d at 1294 (emphasis 
added). Accordingly, the trial court erred by dismissing the Complaint on the basis of comity. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's Order of Dismissal. 
m . THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE UTAH ARBITRATION ACT. 
A. The Order of Dismissal Violates the Utah Arbitration Act's 
Mandatory Stay Requirement. 
PIVP has failed to present legal authority refuting Burkett's argument that the Order of 
Dismissal violates the Utah Arbitration Act's mandatory stay provision. It remains undisputed 
that the Utah Arbitration Act mandates that "[a]n order to submit an agreement to arbitration 
stays any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement." 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(3) (1996) (emphasis added)1. Although PIVP cites two cases 
decided under the Federal Arbitration Act for the proposition that dismissal is proper when 
arbitration is compelled (see Brief of Appellee, pp. 10-12), PIVP's reliance on those two cases is 
misplaced for two reasons. First, the Federal Arbitration Act does not contain a provision 
analogous to Utah's mandating a stay of an action when arbitration is ordered. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 
3 (West 1970). Second, in both cases, the courts determined that "retaining jurisdiction and 
staying the action will serve no purpose/' Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Sea-Land of P.R., Inc., 636 
F.Supp. 750, 757 (D. Puerto Rico 1986); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.. 975 F.2d 1161, 
1164 (5th Cir. 1992). Such a determination depends upon the facts presented by each case. The 
Utah Supreme Court has observed that "[t]he difference between a stay and a dismissal can be of 
great significance to plaintiffs." Power Train, Inc. v. Stuver, 550 P.2d 1293, 1294 (Utah 1976). 
Both the Sea-Land Services, Inc. and Alford cases involved only claims for money judgments. 
See Sea-Land Services, Inc., 636 F.Supp. at 751-52 (plaintiff sought monetary damages for 
breach of contract and tortious interference); Alford, 975 F.2d at 1162 (plaintiff sought monetary 
damages for employment discrimination.) In neither case, therefore, was the court's dimissal 
meaningful to the parties. 
Unlike Sea-Land Services, Inc. and Alford, however, the facts of the present case 
demonstrate that the court's retention of jurisdiction would serve three very important purposes. 
It would ensure that Burkett receives the relief to which he is entitled, i.e. partition of the Reston 
Hotel if he prevails on the merits of his claims (regardless of the forum for that determination)2, 
preserve the status quo, and provide notice via a lis pendens to potential purchasers of the Reston 
1
 It should be noted that the Employment Agreement provides that California law governs its interpretation. 
California law, like Utah law, mandates a stay of actions in which arbitration is compelled. See Cal. Civ. Proc. 
Code § 1281.4 (West 1982). 
2
 See Mountain Plains Constructors v. Torrez, 785 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) ("A stay of the proceedings 
preserves [plaintiffs] right to foreclose on its mechanic's lien if it prevails in arbitration"). 
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Hotel that litigation is pending that could affect their rights in that property.3 Therefore, the 
present case is much more analogous to Mountain Plains Constructors v. Torrez, 785 P.2d 928 
(Colo. 1990) (en banc), where dismissal of the action action pending the arbitration would 
frustrate the plaintiffs remedies. In other words, the present case is one where "[t]he difference 
between a stay and a dismissal can be of great significance to plaintiffs." Power Train, Inc., 550 
P.2d at 1294. Because no basis exists for this Court to follow the reasoning in Sea-Land 
Services, Inc. and Alford to conclude that dismissal is appropriate, this Court should reverse the 
Order of Dismissal. 
B, The Order of Dismissal Violates the Utah Arbitration Act's 
Requirement that Only Parties to an Arbitration Agreement Can Be 
Forced to Arbitrate, 
PIVP has failed to present legal authority refuting Burkett's argument that the Order of 
Dismissal violates the Utah Arbitration Act by forcing arbitration in the absence of an arbitration 
agreement executed by both parties.4 Although PIVP purposely withheld its consent from the 
arbitration clause, PIVP argues that the contract between Burkett and Sterling gives PIVP the 
right to force Burkett to arbitrate. This Court should recognize this argument for what it is—an 
unpersuasive attempt by PIVP to have its cake and eat it, too—and preclude a non-party to an 
arbitration agreement from enforcing that provision. 
3
 It is undisputed that Burkett's right to file a lis pendens pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 (1996) is 
determined by whether his action is dismissed or stayed. PIVP admits that Burkett could not file a lis pendens on 
the basis of the California Action. See Brief of Appellee, p. 14 n.7. The protection provided by a lis pendens in 
this case is more than theoretical - PIVP admitted its intention to refinance or sell the hotel when attempting to 
persuade the trial court to release the lis pendens. (R. 346-61, 364-71). 
4
 Similarly, PIVP does not dispute the well-established rule that arbitration can be compelled only between parties 
to an arbitration agreement. See, e.g.. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). PIVP also 
does not dispute that the Utah Arbitration Act allows courts to compel arbitration only as to those issues that are 
"subject to arbitration under the agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(3) (1996). 
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PIVP relies upon J.J. Ryan & Sons. Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile. S.A.. 863 F.2d 315, 
321 (4th Cir. 1988) for the proposition that a non-signatory can enforce an arbitration clause. See 
Brief of Appellee, p. 8. The J.J. Ryan case is clearly distinguishable because it does not concern 
an arbitration agreement signed by only one party. Rather, the parties in J.J. Ryan had entered 
into numerous agreements with one another, some of which contained arbitration agreements, and 
some of which did not. J.J. Ryan, 863 F.2d at 319. The trial court compelled arbitration as to all 
the parties' disputes due to its finding that the numerous contracts were so intertwined that the 
contracts lacking arbitration clauses "would be largely illusory" in the absence of those 
agreements that contained arbitration agreements. Id at 319. The court also found that the 
agreements must be read in light of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, which states that the public policy favoring arbitration applies "with 
special force in the field of international commerce." Id 
Unlike the situation in J.J. Ryan, the present case does not involve an arbitration 
agreement signed by both parties, and does not concern international agreements governed by 
treaties providing special treatment for arbitration provisions. The J.J. Ryan holding does not 
support PIVP's position that this Court should uphold an order compelling arbitration where the 
defendant chose not to consent to the arbitration provision it seeks to enforce. This Court should 
enforce the Utah Arbitration Act, as well as the established rule that arbitration can be compelled 
only between parties to an arbitration agreement, by reversing the Order of Dismissal.5 
5
 PIVP argues that Burkett "creatively" chose not to name Sterling as a defendant in order to avoid arbitration. See 
Brief of Appellee, p. 8. Nothing could be less creative than Burketfs decision to name only PIVP when the 
contractual provision that has been breached (section 8(a)) requires PIVP to grant Burkett an equity interest in 
certain real property, including the Reston Hotel. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 5-6. PIVP, not Sterling, is the owner 
of record of the Reston Hotel. It is interesting that PIVP accuses Burkett of bringing duplicitous claims but then 
criticizes Burkett for narrowly tailoring his Complaint to name only the necessary parties. 
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IV, THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
BECAUSE IT WAS ERROR TO CONVERT PIVP'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL INTO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
PIVP argues that the judgment below should be upheld because the trial court had the 
authority to review matters outside the pleadings and because Burkett submitted materials outside 
the pleadings. See Brief of Appellee, pp.6-8. This argument is not germane to this appeal. 
Burkett has not asserted that the trial court lacked authority to review matters outside the 
pleadings. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 11-13. Rather, Burkett argues that the trial court erred by 
(1) converting a motion to dismiss, other than a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, into a motion for summary 
judgment, and (2) failing to allow Burkett a reasonable opportunity to submit material relevant to 
a motion for summary judgment. Id. PIVP has not responded to either argument. 
It is undisputed that the trial court's conversion of the Motion to Compel into a motion 
for summary judgment occurred at the end of the hearing and in the absence of prior notice to 
Burkett. It is furthermore undisputed that, even if PIVP had moved under Rule 12(b)(6), Burkett 
would have been entitled to notice and the right to submit materials relevant to the summary 
judgment motion. See Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P (". . . all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56"). The fact that 
the parties submitted some material6 does not mean that Burkett had the opportunity to submit 
materials relevant to a summary judgment. 
The cases cited by PIVP do not support PIVP's position that the trial court's conversion 
was appropriate. In Rodriguez v. Fullerton Tires Corp., 115 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 1997), the court 
found that the defendant was on notice of a possible conversion to summary judgment due to the 
fact that a[g]iven the specific language of Rule 12(b), the inclusion of [extraneous] materials with 
the motion put the nonmovant, Fullerton, squarely on notice that the court had the option of 
6
 Whether those materials were "outside the pleadings" is an interesting question since the documents Burkett 
submitted to the trial court were pleadings in the California Action. 
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treating the motion as one for summary judgment." Rodriguez v. Fullerton Tires Corp.. 115 F.3d 
81, 83 (1st Cir. 1997). Unlike the motion in Rodriguez, however, the motion in the present case 
was a Motion to Compel Arbitration, to Dismiss the Complaint, or in the Alternative, to Stay 
Proceedings. (R. 23-180). There is no basis for this Court to find that the parties' submission of 
extraneous materials pursuant to such a motion put Burkett on notice that he might have summary 
judgment entered against him at the conclusion of the hearing. In fact, the only "extraneous" 
materials Burkett submitted in opposition to the Motion to Compel concerned whether PIVP was 
a party to the arbitration agreement. Unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Motion to Compel did 
not present the question whether Burkett had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. In fact, PIVP does not dispute that Burkett has stated a cognizable claim for relief. See 
Point I, above. Burkett's inclusion of some material that is arguably outside the pleadings does 
not raise any inference that Burkett was provided the opportunity to introduce matters made 
relevant by the conversion to summary judgment. The issues involved in defending a motion to 
compel arbitration are not the same as those involved in defending a motion for summary 
judgment.7 The Rodriguez holding does not provide any basis upon which this Court can affirm 
the trial court's conversion of the Motion to Compel into a motion for summary judgment. 
PIVP's reliance upon the holding of DOIT. Inc. v. Touche. Ross & Co.. 926 P.2d 835 (Utah 
1996) is similarly unavailing. In DOIT, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court, not the trial court, treated 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. DOIT, Inc. v. 
Touche. Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 838-39 n.3 (Utah 1996). In doing so, the Utah Supreme 
Court found that none of the parties was prejudiced by that conversion. Id There was no 
7
 PIVP's argument is especially troublesome due to its logical conclusion. If any type of motion to dismiss, e.g. one 
sought as a sanction for discovery abuses, can be converted at a trial court's whim into a motion for summary 
judgment, then parties will need to present all of their evidence on the merits of their case in order to protect 
against as order awarding summary judgment. 
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indication in DOIT, Inc. that the losing party would have submitted different information if it had 
been on notice of the conversion. Unlike the situation in DOIT, Inc., the circumstances of the 
dismissal in the present case demonstrate that Burkett was prejudiced by the trial court's sudden 
conversion of the Motion to Compel into a motion for summary judgment, and that Burkett 
would have submitted different information had be been notified in advance of that conversion. 
Accordingly, the DOIT, Inc. case provides no support for PIVP's argument that the conversion 
was proper. 
No basis exists upon which this Court could affirm the trial court's conversion of the 
Motion to Compel into a motion for summary judgment, or the trial court's failure to allow 
Burkett a reasonable opportunity to submit material relevant to a motion for summary judgment.8 
Not only was the conversion without legal basis, but also Burkett was not on notice that such a 
conversion could occur. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the Order of Dismissal. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER RELEASING THE LIS PENDENS 
VIOLATES MR, BURKETT9 S STATUTORY RIGHTS AND THE 
PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND LIS PENDENS. 
PIVP has failed to present any reason for this Court to affirm the trial court's order to 
release the lis pendens. See Brief of Appellee, p. 14. Rather, PIVP relies upon the purely circular 
argument that, since no litigation was pending after the court's Order of Dismissal, the court 
acted appropriately by ordering the Lis Pendens released. Id This argument fails for three 
reasons. First, it ignores the fact that this litigation did not end with the trial court's order 
dismissing the aciton. Burkett filed his Notice of Appeal the same day that the Order of Dismissal 
was entered, March 11, 1997. (R. 378-84, 386-88). Second, PIVP's argument ignores the fact 
It is disingenuous for PIVP to argue that this Court should not review this issue because Burkett did not raise the 
issue before the trial court. (See Brief of Appellee, p. 6 n.l.) It is clear from the record that Burkett had no 
opportunity to make any objection to the trial court's "conversion" as it was first mentioned in the trial court's 
ruling on the Motion to Compel. 
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that Burkett informed the trial court of his intention to appeal the trial court's ruling well before 
the court entered its order to release the lis pendens. Third, the argument ignores the fact that 
Burkett's statutory right to file a lis pendens is an important substantive right designed not only to 
protect Burkett's interest and assure his remedy, but also to provide notice to potential purchasers 
of claims against property. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 14-15. PIVP's argument therefore cannot 
support an affirmance of the order to release the lis pendens. Furthermore, the fact that the trial 
court knew when it entered the order that PIVP intended to encumber the property9 makes the 
order particularly egregious. This Court should reverse the order to release the lis pendens. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of Dismissal violated the established standard for granting motions to dismiss, 
the principles of comity, the Utah Arbitration Act, and the policy behind the lis pendens statute. 
In doing so, it cut off Burkett's ability to protect his property interest and to provide notice to 
others of the litigation concerning the ownership of the Reston Hotel. For these reasons, Burkett 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Order of Dismissal and allow the filing of a lis 
pendens against the Reston Hotel. 
9
 PIVP expressly admitted such intention to the trial court prior to the entry of the Order of Dismissal. (R. 346-61, 
364-71.) 
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Dated this 29th day of September, 1997. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
ALEXANDER R. DAHL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
R. Morgan Burkett 
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